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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
S'rATJ<~ OF UT AH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
PE~TER A. PETERSON, 
Dr'f endnnt-Apve,llant. 
BRIEF OF APPI<~LLANT 
Case No. 
10900 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Peter A. Peterson, was charged with 
the crime of Assault with a Deadly Weapon with Intent 
to Inflict Great Bodily Injury. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
To the charge, the appellant entered a plea of not 
guilty. Upon a trial by jury, the defendant was convicted 
of the Crime of Assault with a Deadly Weapon with In-
tent to Inflict Great Bodily Injnry and sentenced to the 
indderrninate term in the Utah State Prison. 
2 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks a reversal of the conviction, or . ' 
in the alternative a reduction of the conviction to simple 
assault. 
STAT1'JJ\fEN'T' OF THE FACTS 
On the 20th day of October, 196G, Keith :Magnnson 
met Linda Skelton in 'West Second So nth A rPa of Salt 
Lake City. After some preliminary negotiations, thc)-
proceeded to her motel room in Seagull Motel, 325 North 
Sc~cond \Y 0st. After they arrived, l\Ir. Magnuson rvmond 
his clothing and l\fiss Skelton removed part of hers (Tr. 
14-15). At this point there was apparently some disagree-
ment regarding Mr. Magnuson's efforts to kiss :Miss Skd-
ton (Tr. 15). Miss Skelton testified Mr. Magnuson tried 
to choke her (Tr. 44). At this point, tlw appellant en-
tered the Motel. Miss Skelton yelled "Pete" and the 
appellant came to the bedroom. He looked in and re-
turned with a knife (Tr. 16, 4G). He walked into the 
room and stopped in front of l\f r. l\Iagnuson. l\Ir. Mag-
nuson put his hand out. Then, either through a motion 
of l\fr. Magnuson ('rr. 47) or the appellant (Tr. lG), 
Mr. l\ragnuson \Vas eut on the hand. l\f r. l\fagnu;.;on th<m 
got dressed and left. 
The State prc'srnted its cas<\ in chief with tlte testi-
mony of jnst one witn0ss, Keith 1fag1111son. A ftpr the 
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state rested its case, the appellant called as a witness 
Linda Skelton, and then the appellant testified on his 
mm hPhalf. 
TIH· State then called as rebuttal witnesses Fern 
Donglwrty, the manager of the motel wherein the alterca-
tion took 1ilace, and Dale Elton, a police officer. Both 
si(l('s t ]H·n rPste<l. 
The jury was tlwn instructed an<l given three pos-
~ihle verdicts: Guilty of Assault with a Deadly Weapon 
\l·itl1 lntent to do Bodily Harm; Guilty of Assault; or 
Xot Guilty. The jnry returned "'ith a wrdict of Guilty 
of Assault with a Deadly Weapon with Intent to do Great 
Bodily Harm. The appellant was sentenced to the in-
determinated term as provided by law in the Utah State 
Prison. 
ARGUMEWI' 
POTNT I 
THF, FACTS FAILED TO SUSTAIN A FIND-
lNU OF GUILTY AS A -MATTER OF LA \V. 
ThP app<·llant submits that as a matt(•r of law the 
fads wonld not snstain a finding of guilty. If we accept 
tl1P ·wrsion of thP facts most fa\'orablP to the State, the 
:lpp1·l l:1nt em1fro11h·d tlil' emnpluining witnt>ss with a }nmt-
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ing knife and when the complaining witness extended hi~ 
hand, the appellant mad<> a "slashing" motion which n 
sulted in a small cut on the complaining witnesses hand. 
'l111e appellant then ld't the room and returned telling 
the complaining witness lw wonld giv(' him " ... lialf :1 
srcond to get the G.D. out of there" (Tr. 17). It is elPai 
from the S(~q1wnce of P\"Pnts that the sole motive of tl1\· 
amwllant wns to cm~s<' ~l r. ?\f ag-nuson to leave the motPi 
l'OOlll. 
The very essence of the crime with whid1 tlw ap1)\'I 
lant was convicted is the intent to inflict gn•at bodily 
injury. State 11• Potcllo, 42 Utah 39G, 132 Pac. 14 (1913): 
State v. Barkas, 91 Utah :174, 65 P.2d 1130 (JD:]i). 
Threatening a lH-'rson with a d<'a<ll.'· wt•apon with tl1i: 
intention of frightening or intimidating him is a simple 
assault but does not constitute Assault with a Deadly 
Weapon with Intent to Inflict Bodily Injury. Barkas. 
s117Jra at 91 Utah 579. 
The intent to inflict injury rnnst lw a specific intt>nt. 
The Snpr<•rne Court of Colorado in Shrcrc 1:. Peo1Jic. 
292 P.2 1020; 12G Colorado 41:3; <l.Pfined sud1 s1wcit'ic 
int<'nt at pagP 102:3. 
Specific~ as applied to inknt to do ,!.~Teat hml-
ily harm, and \\'hieh must lw found as a l'aet lwfore 
conviction is an adJ.!'C'tive wl1ic-l1 ffo;ti11gui~;JiL·s tlJI' ' . 
intPnt to do un•at hodilY harm f'rom otlwr inten-h • 
tions in the appellant's rnirnl at tlH· ti11l<' nl' tlll' 
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co1mnission of the crime, and to require the inten-
tion to he in actual existence in appellant's mind 
at tlw time of the commission of the alleged crime. 
rl'lw h•stimony of both Miss Skelton and the appel-
1wt would lea\'e no doubt that the sole motive of the 
apfH'llant was to have }.fr. Magnuson leave. Even accord-
irw,' to the victim's testimonv there is no indication of anv ' . . 
i11tPnt to inflict great bodily injury. ('l1r. 15-16, 20-21). 
Th.- rnt suff<>n'd by l\f r. 1\Iagnuson was the accidental 
t<·,;nlt of the appellant's att<~mpt:s to intimidate Mr. Mag-
nnson. AJJ]Wllant submits, ho-w<·ver, that the mere at-
1<·,npt to intimidate when not coupled with the intent 
to C'anse bodily harm does not constitute the crime 
('liarg<•d. 
It is significant that the appellant withdrew from 
the room following the alleged asault. The fact that he 
did not pnrsue an aggressive course of action reinforces 
tl1P notion that hi:s motive was not to cause harm to 11-r. 
J!agnuson, lmt merely to eanse him to leave. 
'rlw situation that the appellant found himself m 
\\"Us tlw n•sult of a reqm•st by Miss Skelton. The jnry 
11111st hav<' intl'rpreted tlw <•venh; that occured with preju-
dice Jw· to the n•ason for the eomplaining witnesses 
!wing ill :Miss ~hlton's bedroom and the implications 
tl1at eoulcl ]H' drawn tlwrdrorn. How<•ver, tlte facts fail 
IP :-l1m"· tllat ll11· app<'llant \\'as attt>rnpting to do anything 
111•1r1• tit<u1 1'.i<'d the eo111plaining witness from Miss Skel-
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ton's room at her requeP;t. The state did not show an:v 
complicity between the two. 
In a case snch as this, it is difficult for dcfrnsr 
counsel to cope with the inferences that may be drawn 
from snrronnding circumstances, hnt that are not s11s-
tain0d by the facts. It is also difficult for the jury to 
make an Hnhiased decision. ~Iiss f-ik('lton's apptuPnt prn-
fession, or avocation as the cas<' may lw, wonlcl tend to 
put the appellant's actions in defending hd· ill a [('ss tlian 
favorable light. Yet there is no evicknc<> that l1is actions 
·were anything more than a respons<:> to lwr rt>cpwsL Had 
she been a more respectable person in more res1wctahl<' 
circumstances. tht-> jury ·would most lihly have acqnitkd 
the defendant. In a time when people avoid involvement 
and shirk fron. the defem:P of othns, the d<•frndant did 
p;0t involved ... to his own ddrinwnt. 
Ddc•nclants snhmits that for these reasons th<• jnry 
rendc•red a verdict that cannot hl· snstainPcl by the law. 
The act nself, a small motion causing a cnt on tlH• eorn-
1Jlaining witnesses hand: the snhs<><pwnt witlidrawal of 
the dt>fendant 10avinp; the complaining ·witnPss to l<'aYe 
·withont further tronhl<': all dmw in n•spons(' to Miss 
Sk<>ltnn who was ap1nu·<·ntl:-· in distn·ss; thPsP facts W<'l'l' 
not s11Hiei<'nt to :-mstain a findinp; ol' guilt:•-
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CONCLUSION 
Because of a lack of evidence to support a finding of 
an inknt to inflict bodily harm, the conviction should be 
n·verst>d, or in the alternative, reduced to simple assault. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARD SHEPHERD 
231 East 4th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Appellant 
